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The 2020 Supreme Court Term in the
Shadow of BLM, MeToo, and the
Notorious RBG
The court has agreed to hear cases that involve the enduring white supremist legacy of a Louisiana
law that allowed for non-unanimous jury criminal convictions, standards for evaluating excessive
use of force by police, what is required to sentence a juvenile to life without parole, and military
sexual violence, says Rachel Van Cleave, a law professor and dean emerita at Golden Gate
University School of Law
By Rachel Van Cleave |  October 02, 2020 at 07:52 PM
         (http://www.almreprints.com)
Rachel Van Cleave, Golden Gate University School of Law dean
The upcoming Supreme Court term comes in the context of widespread
protests about police violence, the criminal (in)justice system, continuing
fallout from the #MeToo movement, and the death of iconic Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The court has agreed to hear cases that
involve the enduring white supremist legacy of a Louisiana law that allowed
for non-unanimous jury criminal convictions, standards for evaluating
excessive use of force by police, what is required to sentence a juvenile to
life without parole, and military sexual violence.
It is imperative that the Court acknowledge the di cult truths that Black
Lives Matter protesters, advocates for children and sexual violence
survivors, and plain numbers have been telling us about entrenched
problems with our criminal justice system. In addition, these cases elevate
issues of humanity and dignity when it comes to how we treat some of the
most vulnerable members of society—people of color, children and sexual
violence survivors.
White Supremacist Law’s Legacy
In April, the Court held in Ramos v. Louisiana that the unanimous jury
requirement, followed by the federal courts and every other state (except
Oregon), applies to all states. The court described the white supremacist
origins of Louisiana’s law allowing criminal convictions despite one or two
jurors out of 12 concluding that the state did not prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The goal of the 1898 Louisiana constitutional
convention was to enact a racially neutral law that would dilute the impact
of Black jurors, whom Louisiana could not exclude from jury service. Use of
preemptory challenges by prosecutors has also worked to ensure that no
more than two Black jurors actually served on a jury in the vast majority of
cases. The echoes of this law have had a dramatically disproportionate
impact on African Americans imprisoned in Louisiana.
In Edwards v. Vannoy, the court will determine whether some of the 1,558
prisoners convicted in Louisiana over the vote of at least one, and
sometimes two, jurors will get the bene t of the Ramos ruling. Mr. Edwards,
an African American, was convicted by a jury that included only one African
American. The investigation and interrogation of Edwards, as well as what
occurred at trial included several indicia of unreliability—the fact that police
found no evidence of the crime upon searching Edwards’ home within 48
hours of the o ense, DNA that did not match that of Edwards, physical
coercion by the police to elicit Edwards’ “confession,” and highly suggestive
witness identi cation processes. At trial, the prosecutor challenged all but
one African American juror. In addition, despite the fact that the witness
who identi ed Edwards was white, the judge refused to allow expert
testimony about the highly problematic and unreliable nature of cross-
racial identi cation.
In the current environment calling for reimagining criminal justice, it is
discouraging that the state of Louisiana has not established any conviction
integrity units to evaluate the convictions of those in prison pursuant to the
tainted law. Instead, Louisiana has decided to  ght for continued
imprisonment.
The court will focus on the doctrine of retroactivity. If the court determines
that its ruling in Ramos was a watershed new rule that restored a bedrock
principle of constitutional law in Louisiana, or that Ramos rea rmed a
longstanding rule despite the historical accident of a 1972 ruling by a
plurality of the court, Edwards, and others should get the bene t of the
court’s ruling in Ramos. Edwards v. Vannoy is scheduled for argument Nov.
30.
Police Excessive Force
It was dark in the early morning hours, when four police o cers exited their
unmarked car and approached Ms. Torres while she was in her parked car.
The o cers were planning to arrest someone else with whom Torres had
no connection or relationship. Unable to read the markings on the o cer’s
dark clothing, Torres feared they were carjackers. One o cer attempted to
open the locked driver’s door. Torres began to drive away slowly, and the
o cers  red 13 rounds, shooting her twice in the back. Despite these
injuries, Torres left the scene and shortly thereafter called 911 for
assistance. In this civil rights lawsuit, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that Torres had not been “seized” and therefore had no claim that
o cers violated her Fourth Amendment rights, a rming the district court’s
order granting summary judgement in favor of the o cers. Any plainti 
who brings an excessive force case against police has a number of
formidable hurdles before the case may ever be heard by a jury—was the
use of force reasonable, does the doctrine of quali ed immunity apply, is
the right asserted by the plainti  “clearly established” to subject an o cer
to civil liability for violating the right. Here, the lower courts did not resolve
these questions because they concluded that Torres had not been seized
and therefore the Fourth Amendment did not apply.
In the wake of nearly 1,000 police killings in the last year, disproportionately
a ecting African Americans, the lower court rulings demonstrate a stunning
level of disregard for the life and safety of people. Their reasoning is that
since the o cers did not actually prevent Torres from leaving, she was not
seized and therefore cannot claim a Fourth Amendment violation. In other
words, the fact that the police didn’t kill Torres or in ict even more serious
harm that would have prevented her from driving away, she has no claim
against the o cers. This makes no sense. In addition, it does not adhere to
Supreme Court precedent holding that o cers seize a person when they
have applied physical force. Clearly,  ring 13 shots, two of which entered
Torres’ back, amount to an application of physical force covered by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable seizures. There is a
straightforward path for the Supreme Court to hold police accountable for
excessive use of force and recognize the humanity and dignity of those
subject to police violence. Torres v. Madrid is scheduled for argument Oct.
14.
Punishment of Juveniles
Approximately 2,600 people are serving life without parole (LWOP) prison
sentences for o enses they committed as juveniles. Some of these children
were as young as 13 years old. Although Brett Jones is white, African
Americans are disproportionately more likely to receive LWOP for o enses
committed as juveniles. The court has gradually come to accept the
signi cant evidence that di erences between adults must be considered
when imposing punishment on children who commit crimes. Eight years
ago, the court concluded in Miller that LWOP for juveniles is
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment in all but the rarest of
circumstances; where the sentencing authority has found the juvenile to be
“irreparably incorrigible.” In Jones v. Mississippi, the court is being asked to
clarify the standard set out in Miller.
To recognize the humanity and dignity of children, the court must de ne
“irreparably incorrigible” narrowly and require sentencing authorities to
satisfy a high standard before imposing LWOP on juveniles. To do
otherwise, would be to cast aside as disposable hundreds of people who
made terrible mistakes when brain science shows that young people are
not small adults; they are less mature, and their brains are far from fully
developed. The court’s ruling should  rmly ensure that LWOP is rarely, if
ever, applied to those who commit o enses as children. Jones v. Mississippi
is scheduled for argument Nov. 3.
Military Sexual Violence
The #MeToo movement has taught us that myriad reasons explain why
survivors of sexual violence sometimes wait years before disclosing that
they were sexually assaulted. Many #MeToo reports have illustrated that
some survivors blame themselves and are ashamed to report sexual
violence. Many survivors have stated that they did not trust others to
believe them. Survivors of military sexual violence face the added pressure
of conforming to military culture and expectations, and the likelihood of
being retaliated against. In addition, military sexual assault survivors are
reluctant to report rape when their commanding o cer or instructor is the
rapist. In the consolidated cases of US v. Briggs, U.S. v. Collins, and U.S. v.
Daniels, the court is asked to resolve a matter of statutory interpretation
about the statute of limitations for sexual violence crimes committed by
military servicemembers.
The statutory interpretation question is complicated by the fact that the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), until 2006, provided that rape was
punishable by death. None of the defendants in these consolidated cases
received the death penalty. However, they argue that at the time of the
sexual assaults for which they were convicted, the UCMJ provided that
o enses punishable by death had no limitation for prosecution and
punishment. Here is where echoes of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as an
advocate enter.
In 1976, Ginsburg co-authored an amicus brief opposing capital
punishment for the crime of rape, in Coker v. Georgia. The brief focused on
the sexist and racist justi cations that undergirded the death penalty. Sexist
in how this reinforced the notion that women were the property of men
and the rape damaged their woman’s purity. Racist in how the death
penalty had been applied nearly exclusively to African American men in
Georgia.
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The court could skirt the death penalty issue and rely on the fact that the
UCMJ has consistently had no statute of limitation for prosecuting rape and
sexual assault, despite changes in statutory language. Nonetheless, we will
miss Ginsburg’s voice and clear-eyed analysis in resolving the tensions
raised in these consolidated cases—procedural fairness for defendants,
justice for survivors, racism and sexism. These cases are scheduled for
argument Oct. 13.
During these tumultuous and uncertain times, I recognize that we cannot
rely on the court to pave a path or light the way toward reimagining
criminal justice. However, the court should pay attention to the injustices
su ered by people of color, children and sexual violence survivors and not
further dim the lights. Martin Luther King Jr. stated, “Darkness cannot drive
out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love
can do that.”
Rachel A. Van Cleave is a professor of law and dean emerita at Golden
Gate University School of Law where she teaches criminal procedure,
constitutional law and reimagining criminal justice.
Dig Deeper
  SHARE    SHARE
Trending Stories
1 States Say the Online
Bar Exam Was a
Success. The Test-Taker
Who Peed in His Seat
Disagrees
(/therecorder/2020/10/07/states-
say-the-online-bar-
exam-was-a-success-
the-test-taker-who-
peed-in-his-seat-
disagrees/)
LAW.COM
(HTTPS://WWW.LAW.COM/)
2 Total U.S. death rate is
below average, CDC
says
(/2020/04/17/total-u-s-
death-rate-is-still-
below-average-cdc-412-
96700/)
BENEFITSPRO
(HTTPS://WWW.BENEFITSPRO.COM/)
3 Paul Weiss: COVID-19
Bonuses 'Would Not Be
Appropriate'
(/americanlawyer/2020/10/06/paul-
